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america and the rational road
peace
to
RICHARD

D POLL

on the assumption that neither human nature nor providential design dooms man to nuclear destruction inquiry concerning obstacles which bestrew the path to peace is necessary and
proper even urgent the analysis which follows is hopeful to
can reason prevent another general war
the question
the
answer is yes indeed if the argument be limited to the present generation can is to be interpreted in terms not of possibility but probability
such optimism amid the headlines on communism castro
and the congo surely requires elucidation and defense
one dictionary gives two relevant meanings for the word
reason
ability to think and draw conclusions and right
thinking good sense there is a third definition which invites
passing comment sanity for if the men at the controls of the
missile launchers take leave of their sanity the right thinking
and good sense of all the rest of us will avail little it is
assumed that defense arrangements both here and in other
nuclear armed nations are so structured that no one mans hitting the panic button can ignite the holocaust
for those who recall that many past wars have been triggered by impulse or incident a hapsburg ambassador thrown
out of a prague window or a hapsburg heir slain in a bosnian
street attention is called to the fact that the last sixteen years
have seen scores of threats claims and deeds of violence which
would have been cause for war in former generations yet the
the ability to think and draw
hot war withholds reason
poll is professor of history and political science at brigham young
university
this paper is derived from a presentation on the great issues forum at
the university of utah february 24 1960 the subject was can reason
prevent international anarchy
and the other participant was dr G homer
durham since appointed president of arizona state university

dr
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is the key to this remarkable change and the
conclusions
change is pragmatic evidence for the proposition here advanced
III
if it comes world war 111
ill will come deliberately and because
it will come deliberately it need not and probably will not
come in the predictable future
the record failing to produce a significant war which lacked
rational justification by at least one of the combatants the argument which follows accepts clausewitz s classic dictum war
is a mere continuation of policy by other means it further
classifies the wars of history in terms of two major policy objectives
jectives those to change existing power arrangements and those
to preserve them it asks what can be done to prevent such
wars in the years ahead
consider first the myriad wars for which the end of policy
has been some alteration in the status quo A piece of territory
is coveted and the owners refuse to sell or surrender A commercial opportunity is monopolized and the overtures of outsiders are rebuffed A new creed is born and peaceful proselyte
proselyt
ing is deemed too slow existing power structures seem too confining for a nation aggressively led or newly come to strength
in short an important ambition needs serving and war is judged
the swiftest the most efficient or the only means to that end
such wars for land loot status or idealogical hegemony
are deliberately made assassination or other incident may precipitate them but rational reflection antecedes the event and
attends the choice of war jenkins ear would never have gained
bradin
immortality if british businessmen had not seen tradin
tradingg opportunities
tuni ties in a humbled spanish empire zachary taylor would
not have led his men into ambush on disputed texas ground
if the vision of an american california had not captured the
imagination of president polk and an expansionist electorate
our own generation is witnessing the obsolescence of this
type of war at least insofar as relations among the major
powers are concerned war nuclear war is no longer a
means to an ambitious or imperialist end because no end
short of national survival itself is worth the price of war most
rational people thought this lesson had been made clear by
world war 1LI that was the conflict which proved that no
one really wins a general war unfortunately all that it
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taught those sane and sober germans who followed hitler was
II
that you win nothing in a war which you lose world war 11
was only in part a madman s doing
hiroshima finally made the point As motives go fear is
not praiseworthy but it does influence policy men who think
modem weaand draw conclusions dread the awful force of modern
pons and their choices are limited by that fear men of good
sense in washington and moscow london and peking know
that hydrogen warheads and ICBM s have made traditional
clausewitz style wars for aggrandizement unthinkable among
the major nations of the world chinese conduct since korea
warrants their inclusion in the foregoing list despite their bellicose propaganda line to the extent that the reported ideological split between the two red capitals has substance and mao
is counting on world war 111
III
lii the probability is still strong
that by the time he develops the capacity to wage it he will
discover that china too has a stake in preventing it
parenthetically what of limited localized wars
on insurrections and civil wars with or without great power encouragement and support fear of the atomic abyss has
not yet imposed a ban nor are probing actions like those
recently on the india china and israeli arab frontiers inter
congo witness that we are far from the
ducted
dicted laos and the congovitness
abandonment of the politics of violence however the failure
of the sino russian adventure in korea and the subsequent abstention
sten tion by all the major powers from resort to substantial
armed force against independent external targets is ground for
hope to the extent that limited war entails the risk that
its acceptable limits will be transgressed the nuclear inhibitor
fear operates
the role and the risks of limited war are worth much fuller
treatment however the concern here is not with brushfires
but continental conflagrations if right thinking can avoid the
latter the firemen of the free nations and the policemen of
the united nations may be able to keep the former within
tolerable bounds
turn now to the second class of wars for which the end
of policy is the protection of the status quo A revolution in
france threatens the monarchial order of europe by example
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and propaganda A religious heresy in germany takes such
strong root that fire and the sword seem necessary A vital
life line is seized and british and
segment of an imperial lifeline
french bombs rain on cairo slav nationalism menaces the
austro hungarian empire germany sees time running against
jeffi
beffi in
belli
sarajevo becomes a causus jemmi
the triple alliance and Sarajevo
short a vital national interest is threatened and war is judged
the best hope or the only hope for its preservation
this the war born of desperation is the greater threat to
our generation because if anything is likely to override the
nuclear fear it is another fear home family freedom faith
these critically threatened and reasonable men may be brought
to the desperate decision that ICBM s are not after all the
ultimate evil the challenge to reason which confronts the
growing number of nations with nuclear capability is to see
that none of their number feels driven to this awful choice
since the soviet union britain france soon china and
eventually other states will share this capability and responsibility there would seem to be some obligation to establish
the probability that all these will meet the challenge space
permitting a case for each could be made As for britain and
france irrationality of the order of wholesale insanity would
be prerequisite to their launching a nuclear war the soviet
record of aggression and deceit is depressingly clear but neither
her gospel of world revolution nor her external power interests
require an atomic offensive the same is true of red china
though the population explosion and the remembrance of an
ancient east asian empire create temptations for aggressive
action which will only be resisted as long as it is clear that the
price of yielding is too high even for a government which
boasts two or three hundred million people to spare
this analysis will focus on america because her policy
lies within our sphere of influence her reason is our reason
and she is no less capable of failing the test than the others
the danger that the united states will be accessory to a
general war for the status quo lies in several directions all discernible
cer to good sense and avoidable by right thinking here
are four which directly involve foreign policy
1

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol3/iss3/2

there

is the danger of doing too little

4

Poll: America and the Rational Road to Peace

AMERICA AND THE RATIONAL ROAD TO PEACE
2
3

much
4

7

there is the danger of doing too much
there is the danger of doing too little and then too
there

is the danger of confusing success with failure

the
the

first the doing of too little is the most likely error
magnitude and the duration of the effort required
to prevent a change of international power relationships incompatible with our vital interests may be greater than the
american people will be willing to accept soviet russia and
communist china for reasons more imperial than ideological
will be exploiting areas of weakness for the foreseeable future
tactics will vary and a hopeful possibility is that they may
not always support each other but the pressure will continue
and where counterpressure
counter pressure is insufficient gains will be made
overt war for reasons suggested earlier will probably not be
used but subsidies subversion propaganda and threats are
potent weapons it is conceivable that what hitler called the
artichoke method of conquest may in time strip so many
leaves from the free world plant that exposed america must
fight or be devoured since either option then would be disaster the opinion is of minor consequence that a people who
would permit themselves to be backed into such a predicament
would probably surrender when the choice had to be made
however no greater ability to think and draw conclusions than americans have already shown is necessary to
avert this danger imagination money reasonableness science
patience these applied in a spirit of enlightened self interest
can bring such strength to the will to resist among free peoexist
coexist
ples as may in time transform an expedient peaceful co
vendit no more imagination will
ence into a durable modus vi vendl
be required than launched the beri
berl
berlin
in airlift or devised the
uniting for peace resolutions for the united nations no
greater share of our national income will be needed than
brought marshall plan recovery to western europe and today
supports ugly americans in many blighted regions of the
is demanded than that which
earth no more reasonableness Js
buried hatred of japan and germany in half a decade and
now with fingers crossed explores disarmament possibilities
11
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with the kremlin and even faces the prospect of contact with
peking no more scientific miracles must occur than made the
lesson of hiroshima possible and the conquest of polio as
long as the missile gap means only that the other side can
kill us three times while we are killing them twice the greatest
danger is not the prospect of attack

no

greater patience is required either than that which
has borne us through sixteen years of unmatched stress with
no more serious symptoms of irrationality than rock n roll and
ism but patience is a perishable commodity parmccarthyism
McCarthy
ticul
ticularly
arly with americans if so mental a phenomenon as reason may be said to have an achilles heel the american approach to the avoidance of war may be most vulnerable here

tired of the tension and

the taxes we may persuade ourselves that they are no longer necessary having survived so
III
long without the dreaded world war 111
ili or the forcible soviet move which would have provoked it we may forget the relation ship between the results of the policy of containment
lationship
and its price seeing how amiable the comrades can be when
the price of truculence is embarrassment in hungary and
failure in india we may conclude that they can be safely left
unwatched and unchecked impatient for the flesh
fleshpots
pots of
normalcy we may abdicate the leadership which our country
has creditably borne since the last great war

the

hopefulness that good sense will prevail against this
temptation is based on the record three presidents of varying
politics and temperament and a decisive majority of congressmen of both parties have seen the wisdom in sustaining the
free worlds ramparts and the american people have approved
for all our materialism moral flabbiness status seeking and
payola we have yet borne the inconvenience and expense of
defensive commitments too far flung and intricate for most of
realty to understand after sixteen costly and frustrating
us really
slashers and the get out
years the country still assigns the tax clashers
of the world ers to the eccentric fringe and willingly even enthusiastically picks up the U N check for the congo operation and enlists in peace corps to make the world safe for
humanity
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danger that the united states will precipitate war by
doing too much is remote but not to be ignored conceivably
we could crowd the soviet union or china so closely and aggressively
gres sively that they would judge war preferable to its alternative to the extent that the missile gap is a significant factor rash action by the united states or our major allies is particularly fraught with danger for if khrushchev and company
become convinced that war is inevitable the pressure will be
almost irr
irrestible
estable to wage it while that weapons differential
estible
obtains

convinced as we are of the purity of our motives it is
difficult to credit the possibility that moscow and peking regard us as a threat yet no day passes without expressions of
the most hostile sentiment toward the communist states by
prominent americans consider the post world war I1 record
of intervention and non
nonrecognition
recognition not blotted out by the
II to place our
marriage of convenience in world war 11
NATO SEATO and far eastern bases in soviet perspective
recall the indignation with which many americans greeted the
announcement that red missiles would be tested in our pacific
ocean moscow is no farther from ankara than st louis is
from mexico city imagine our reaction to the establishment
of a russian military base in the mexican capital or havana
this is not to object to the base in ankara or the seventh
fleet in the formosa strait or our polaris submarines where
ever they are these are defensive measures and are not likely
to be construed otherwise unless our basic policy changes assuming russian rationality a strong deterrent force in the free
world reduces the temptation to consider war either for the
alteration or the preservation of the soviet power position
the danger of doing too much lies in overestimating our
strength and underestimating the strength and durability of our
potential foes this was rather more likely to occur before the
recent satellite and missile revelations than it is now but there
are still among us those who hold that the communist bloc
is a hollow shell which will collapse under sustained and increasing pressure for them a policy of defense is defeatist
liberation is the goal and political isolation economic warfare
and subversion are the methods
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such talk of rolling back the iron curtain was the chief
evidence cited by an In tourist guide in moscow to prove that
war monger hungary
peace loving john foster dulles was a warmonger
showed how far the kremlin would go to prevent the loss
of a satellite in this youth s opinion it was a justified defensive action surely it is not right thinking to expect that the
soviets will submit to the division of their empire or the subversion of their system without a fight
one can feel profound sympathy for the oppressed in
satellite europe and south africa and franco s spain and
still regard their immediate deliverance as an infeasible goal
for american foreign policy to confuse the morally desirable with the politically possible is a natural error for a
humane people but it can bring disaster since amelioration of
the lot of the people behind the iron curtain is more likely to
result from economic growth and the relaxation of international tensions than from external deliverance a policy of
reasonableness rather than belligerence may in fact be morally
as well as politically sound
the danger of doing too little and then too much stems
from that natural impulsive tendency of democratic peoples
americans in particular to go to extremes changes occur
problems arise old techniques and remedies become obsolete
the process is continuous and if we are fortunate those whose
responsibility is to watch the course of events perceive the
new problems and devise approaches to them but to the people
at large no problem is recognized until it has achieved spectacular
tacular often ominous proportions and then the reaction may
be irrational george kennan
keiman puts it aptly
kerman
1I sometimes wonder whether in this respect a democracy
is not uncomfortably similar to one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of
a pin he lies in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little
attention to his environment he is slow to wrath in fact
you tactically
practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware
that his
is interests are being disturbed but once he grasps this
he lays about him with such blind determination that he not
only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat you wonder whether it would not have been wiser for
him to have taken a little more interest in what was going
I1
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on at an earlier date and to have seen whether he could not
have prevented some of these situations from arising instead
of proceeding from an undiscriminating indifference to a holy
wrath equally undiscriminating1
undiscriminating1

the

possibility still exists of a sudden popular response
to an international surprise so violent as to destroy the peace
however enough people besides professors are reading kennan and his fellow pundits these days to sustain optimism
aggressors necessarily have the initiative and in our defensive
role we have not always anticipated their moves in time to
forestall them or to counter them effectively but reason dicindo china
tated the reaction to greece and berlin korea and indochina
suez and lebanon the fiasco of our emotion distorted china
policy is an exception which only confirms the point and the
present approach to latin america suggests that the key policy
makers at least have not forgotten the lesson in our now
customary assignment of international cleaner upper we have
often used the wrong soap or filled the tub too deep or
scrubbed too vigorously or failed to look behind the ears
but so far we have not thrown out the baby with the bath
water
point four the danger of confusing success with failure
is typically american we may be tempted to give up the responsibility of leadership and so immeasurably increase the
risk of war because we expect too much sixteen years of
military preparations and treaty making find the russians still
there half a generation of taxes to support the united nations
and foreign aid have not purchased the love and cooperation
of all the noncommunist
non
communist peoples material exertions yes
and idealism unparalleled in history have brought us no brighter prospect of relaxation than we faced in 1945 surely we
have failed
the american reluctance to accept less than perfect answers has been attributed to many causes charles marshall
mentions our extraordinarily successful past and our faith in
engineering in laws and in advertising whatever its cause
george kennan american diplomacy 19001950
1900 1950
go press 1952 pp
ap 6566
65 66
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we react to imperfect solutions with dismay and sometimes
a sense of betrayal marshall illustrates this delightfully
I1 recall a story told in mexico A man heavy in need and
apesos he adgreat in faith wrote a letter asking for 100 pesos
dressed it to god and mailed it the postmaster had no idea
how to handle the letter he opened it seeking a clue he
was touched by the mans story of need he passed the hat
among the postal employees thus 75 pesos
apesos were raised
these were placed in an envelope to await the return ofi the
inquiring
importuning man A few days later he was back inqui
ring
for mail he was given the envelope opened it counted the
money and glowered then he went to the counter and
scribbled out another letter it read dear god 1I am still
apesos short please make up the difference but dont send
25 pesos
it through the local post office 1I think it is full of thieves 2

the current tendency

toward hysteria about the communist
menace illustrates the problem A standard technique of the
professional fear mongers
bongers is to give statistical evidence that
america s policy toward the world communist threat has
been a flat failure in 1945 there were only 4500000 hard
core communists in the world it is argued and they controlled
180000000 people today there are 35000000 communists
and they control over 900000000 people land and souls have
been brought under the red yoke at the rate of 1000 square
miles and 130000 people per day day in and day out year
in and year out surely this is disaster
disaster it would be if the communists gains had continued so uniformly and so long but since the capture of
china the red gains have in fact been limited indeed since
the indochinese
indo chinese settlement of 1954 not one square mile of
territory has gone behind the iron and bamboo curtains unless one counts a few acres of himalayan scenery whose occu
cupation
pation may prove a major diplomatic error for mao tse tung
berala and the
if real estate is what counts the indian state of kerala
tiny principality of san marino are quantitative evidence which
could be used to support the argument that the tide of the
ideological struggle is turning
cuba obviously argues against so naive a conclusion and
charles marshall
the nature of foreign policy
bulletin march 17 1952 418

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol3/iss3/2

department of state

10

Poll: America and the Rational Road to Peace

AINERICA
AMERICA AND THE RATIONAL ROAD TO PEACE

13

emphasizes that the techniques of containment do not suffice against poverty and oppression but reactions in the U N
and the organization of american states as well as in washington attest that the remedy for castro is sustained constructive action not despair
the equating of success with the abolition of trouble is
understandable but unreasonable it can imperil us in two
ways despairing of results from our present essentially pragmatic approach to international affairs we may retreat into
our shell until the day when the power we fear stands athwart
the world and bids us bow or frustrated but less pessimistic
we may take arms against the sea of troubles
with no more good sense than is required for imperfect
husband and imperfect wife to live together in reasonable accord americans can accommodate themselves to a world in
which millennial peace must await the millennium with perspective
spec tive and patience we can allocate our great but not unlimited power among the tasks before us resisting the temptation to shirk responsibility or the equally hazardous temptation to undertake too much we can find encouragement in
partial successes and face setbacks without loss of faith in our
democratic way of life
the record of the american people in producing and accepting rational approaches to the complex and formidable
international problems of the atomic age is a creditable one
to erect effective barriers against a vigorous and unscrupulous
imperialism while barred by moral and material considerations
from using unlimited war as an instrument of defensive or
revisionist policy is no mean accomplishment the future need
tap only those resources of right thinking which the american people have already shown that they possess for this
argument to prevail to the extent that the issue of war or
peace lies within our determination and to a very large extent it does lie with us reason can prevent another general

war
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